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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
On appeal, Mr. Gill argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due
process of law when it refused to augment the record with the transcript of his Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) hearing. Additionally, Mr. Gill argues that the
district court abused its discretion when it partially denied his Rule 35 motion.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Gill left the state of Idaho without updating his sex offender registration.
(Presentence investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.46.) 1 During this time, Mr. Gill
believed he was another person. (PSI, p.47.) A mental health evaluation found that
Mr. Gill suffers from extreme mental illness, including a dissociative disorder, which led
to his belief that he was actually someone else. 2 (PSI, p.323.}
Mr. Gill entered an Alford3 plea to Failure to Register as a Sex Offender,
I.C. §§ 18-8304,

18-8307,

18-8308(2).

(R.,

pp.143-44,

149-55;

see

generally

Tr. 2/3/2011.} Mr. Gill also admitted he had three prior felony convictions and entered a
guilty plea to the Persistent Violator enhancement, IC. § 19-2514. (R., pp.57-58, 69-70;

see generally Tr. 2/3/2011.}

In a letter to the court, Mr. Gill disputed most of the

1

The electronic record titled 38754 Gill PSl.pdf contains many documents, including
PSls from this case and the two prior cases, two addenda to the PSI, and an order
Amending the PSI. For ease of reference, these documents will collectively be
referenced as "the PSI" and the page citation will refer to the page number from the
collective document.
2
The Court also ordered an LC. § 18-211 evaluation. Although the competency
evaluations were attached to the PSI, the district court correctly refused to consider any
materials derived from the competency evaluation at sentencing.
3
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970}.

1

contents of the PSL (PSI, pp.37-39.) The district court executed a unified sentence of
twenty years, with ten years fixed. {R., pp.162-64.)
Thereafter Mr. Gill timely filed a Rule 35 motion to reduce the sentence.
(R., p.171.)

Mr. Gill's Rule 35 motion included an affidavit and several documents.

(Affidavit of Mr. Gill.) A Rule 35 hearing was held. (Minutes from the Rule 35 Hearing,
7/21/2011.) After the hearing, the district court altered Mr. Gill's sentence and executed
a unified sentence of twenty years, with five years fixed.

(Order Granting Motion to

Reduce Sentence.) IVlr. Gill timely appealed the judgment of conviction and the order
altering his sentence.

{R., pp.162-63, 166-68; Order Granting Motion to Reduce

Sentence.)
On appeal, Mr. Gill filed a motion to augment the record with the Rule 35 hearing
transcript. (Motion to Augment the Record, 8/8/2011.} The State did not object to the
motion. The Supreme Court denied the motion to augment with the transcript of the
Rule 35 hearing, because "it appears no evidence was produced at the hearing."
(Order Augmenting the Record, 9/9/2011.) Thereafter, Mr. Gill filed a renewed motion
to augment the record, citing the court minutes which indicated IVlr. Gill and the district
court judge were exchanging comments during the Rule 35 hearing. (Renewed Motion
to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof,
10/6/2011; Minutes from the Rule 35 Hearing, 7/21/2011.) The State did not object to
the renewed motion.

The Court denied the renewed motion to augment the record.

(Order Denying Renewed Motion to Augment and To Suspend the Briefing Schedule,
10/28/2011.)

2

ISSUES
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Gill due process and equal protection
when it denied his Motion to Augment with the transcript of the Rule 35 hearing?

2.

Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it partially denied Mr. Gill's
Criminal Rule 35 Motion for a Reduction of Sentence?

3

ARGUMENT

I.
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Gill Due Process And Equal Protection When It
Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The Transcript Of The Rule 35
Hearing

A.

Introduction
Mr. Gill asserts that the most relevant transcript for his Rule 35 appeal is missing

from the record.

The district court originally executed a unified sentence of twenty

years, with ten years fixed. (R., pp.162-64.) After the Rule 35 hearing, the district court
altered the sentence, and executed a unified sentence of twenty years, with five years
fixed. (Order Granting Motion to Reduce Sentence.) The sentence, as altered by the
order granting the Rule 35 motion, is the sentence to be reviewed on appeal. Mr. Gill
submits that the district court's decision to alter the sentence was based al least in part
on Mr. Gill's comments on his own behalf at the Rule 35 hearing.

Thus, the most

important transcript for review of the sentence currently in place, and now before the
court on appeal, is not in the record.
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause and equal protection clause to deny an
indigent defendant access to transcripts of trial proceedings which are relevant to issues
the defendant intends to raise on appeal.

The only way a state can constitutionally

preclude an indigent defendant access to a requested transcript is if the State can prove
that the transcript is irrelevant to the appeal.
Unlike State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457 (2002), in this case the district court asked
Mr. Gill several questions directly and Mr. Gill responded to the district court. Therefore,
the Rule 35 hearing was more than just argument of counsel, and the order partially
4

granting the Rule 35 motion was based on something more than documentary evidence
and argument.

B.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Gill Due Process And Equal Protection
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The Transcript Of The
Jurisdictional Review Hearing

1.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Gill With
Access To The Requested Transcript, Has Denied Him Due Process
Because He Cannot Obtain A Merit Based Appellate Review Of His
Sentencing Claims

The constitutions of both United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; ID. CONST. art.

I, §13.
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965);
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981).
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood,
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United
States Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution."

Maresh v. State,

Dept. of Health and Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 227 (1998) (citing
Smith v. Idaho Dep't of Correction, 128 Idaho 768, 771 (1996)).
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See
I.C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript,
the cost of such transcript must be created at county expense.
5

I.C. § 1-1105(2);

I.C. § 19-863(a).

Idaho court rules also address this issue.

I.C.R. 5.2 mandates the

production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant.

I.C.R. 5.2(a).

Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding before the court
.... " Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to "order a transcript

to be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from paying such a fee as
provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.?(a). An appeal from an order denying an Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 motion is an appeal of right as defined in Idaho Appellate Rule 11.
State v. Fuller, 104 Idaho 891, 891-92 (Ct. App. 1983).

The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the
relevant trial proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these
cases.

The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal

protection clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent
defendants and those with financial means is not tolerated.

However, the second

theme limits the states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for
review.
request.

The states do not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they
In order to meet the constitutional mandates of due process and equal

protection, the states must provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless
some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous.
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a
certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the
proceedings, be furnished them without cost." Griffin, 351 at 13. At that time, the State
6

of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been sentenced to
death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase transcripts
themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme Court was
whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty defendants
was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16.
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich,
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system - all people charged with
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of
justice in every American court."' Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id.

The Supreme Court went on to hold as

follows:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does give appellate review can do so in a way that discriminates
against some convicted defendants on account of their poverty. Appellate
review has now become an integral part of the Illinois trial system for
finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. Consequently at
all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious discriminations.

Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted).

In order to satisfy the constitutional

mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be
provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20.
7

In Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency.

In

that case, the State argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of
his conviction by the Ohio appellate court. Bums, 360 U.S. at 257.

The United States

Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." Id. "This principle is no less
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of
that procedure solely because of his indigency." Id.
In State v. Draper, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under
the present standard, . . . they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court first expanded upon its statement
in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is
available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all of the
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts.

The

Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be
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adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial
proceedings. Id. at 497-99.

Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protectlons
to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on
appeal. In doing so, it was held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument
that he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal.

Id. at 195. If the State

wants to deny the defendant's request, it is the State's burden to prove that the
requested items are not necessary for the appeal. Id.
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the
Idaho Court of Appeals.

See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v.

Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App.
2007).
Here, an application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a
situation analogous to the facts of Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863). In that case, a
transcript was necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed
without the transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly in Idaho, an appellant must
provide an adequate record or the appeal can be dismissed. "It is well established that
an appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate
court can review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of the
record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial
court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Beck, 128 Idaho
416, 422 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991); State v.

Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541
9

(Ct. App. 1992)). If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes,
that may be sufficient so that a "meaningful review of [an appellant's] claim is possible,
although the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel
not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] Court's
review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999). If Mr. Gill fails to provide
the appellate court with the requested item, the legal presumption will apply and
Mr. Gill's claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is state action alone
which prevents him from access to the requested items, then such action is a violation
of due process, as per Lane, and any such presumption should no longer apply.
Without the requested item there is no way to review the district court's order altering
the sentence.
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of
both due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts of trial
proceedings on appeal. The decision to deny Mr. Gill's Motion to Augment will render
his appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing transcript supports
the district court's Order Granting Motion to Reduce Sentence.

This functions as a

procedural bar to the review of Mr. Gill's appellate sentencing claims on the merits, and
therefore, Mr. Gill should either be provided with the requested transcript or the
presumption should not be applied.

2.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Gill With
Access To The Requested Transcript Has Denied Hirn Due Process
Because He Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal

In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
10

Constitution. In coming to this conclusion, the United State Supreme Court reasoned
that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricably related to due process that the
denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. The
Supreme Court also stated that under the facts of Powell "the necessity of counsel was
so vital and imperative that the failure to make an effective appointment of counsel was
likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ...
[to] hold otherwise would to ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted to, 'that
there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free
government which no member of the Union may disregard."' Id. at 71-72.
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, (1963), the United States Supreme Court
relied on Griffin, supra, and is progeny and determined that the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendant's the
right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of
Douglas was extended to the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal.

According to the United State Supreme Court:
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to counsel
on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant has a right to
counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it comprehended the right to
effective assistance of counsel.
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397.

The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the
United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a conscientious
examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made.
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements

of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he
11

support his client's interest's to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995).

In this case, the lack of access to the requested

transcript has prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of
the case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether
there is an additional issue to raise, or whether there is a factual support either in favor
of any argument made or either undercutting an argument. Therefore, Mr. Gill has not
obtained review of the trial proceedings based on the merits and was not provided with
effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor.
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991 )), the starting point of evaluating
whether counsel renders effective assistance of counsel in a criminal action is the
American Bar Association Standards For Criminal Justice, The Defense Function.
These standards still offer insight into the role and responsibilities of appellate counsel.
Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state:
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence .... Counsel should
advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMII\JAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION,

Std. 4-8.3(b). In the absence of access to the requested transcript, counsel neither can
make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal, nor
can counsel consider all issues that might affect the district court's order altering the
sentence.

12

Mr. Gill is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and effective
assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to all of the relevant transcripts.
Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Gill's constitutional right to due
process which includes a right to the effective assistance of counsel in this appeal.
Accordingly, counsel should be provided with access to the requested transcript and
should be allowed the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing
raising issues which arise as a result of that review.

3.

Unlike State v. Strand, The Dialogue Between Mr. Gill And The District
Court Was More Than Just Documentary Evidence And Argument

State v. Strand, supra, addressed when a defendant is entitled to a transcript of

the Rule 35 hearing on appeal.
"Both equal protection and due process emphasize the central aim of our
entire judicial system-all people charged with crime must, so far as the law
is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every
American court."' The State is not required, however, to purchase a
stenographer's transcript in every case in which a defendant cannot buy
one, ... nor is the State required to provide a transcript of all proceedings
held below. "[T]he fact that an appellant with funds may choose to waste
his money by unnecessarily including in the record all of the transcripts
does not mean that the State must waste its funds by providing what is
unnecessary for adequate appellate review." The State is only required to
provide an indigent defendant a record on appeal that is sufficient for
adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the proceedings
below.
Strand, 137 Idaho at 462. In Strand, neither the defendant nor the State offered any

testimony. Id. In that case, a transcript of the Rule 35 hearing "would have shown only
the arguments, if any, Defendant's counsel made during the hearing in an attempt to
convince the district court to grant the Defendant leniency."

Id. at 463.

Thus, "[a]

transcript of the hearing is not necessary for the Defendant to argue on appeal why it
was an abuse of discretion for the district court not to grant the leniency requested." Id.
''[W]hen a hearing is held but only documentary evidence is offered, the denial of the

13

motion to reduce sentence can be adequately reviewed on appeal without a
stenographic transcript of the hearing." Id.
In this case, although Mr. Gill did not testify, it appears from the court minutes
that Mr. Gill was actively engaged in dialogue with the district court during the Rule 35
hearing.

(Rule 35 Hearing Court Minutes, dated 7/21/2011, p.2 ("13: 14:51 - Judge:

Williamson, Darla comments and questions the Defendant with the Def's interspersed
comments ... 13:17:01 - Judge: Williamson, Darla comments and questions the
Defendant further").)

Unlike Strand, at the Rule 35 hearing the district court asked

Mr. Gill questions directly and Mr. Gill responded to the district court. Therefore, the
Rule 35 hearing was more than just argument of counsel, and the order altering the
sentence was based on something more than the documentary evidence and argument.
For all the reasons stated above, Mr. Gill requests access to the requested
transcript and the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising
issues which arise as a result of that review.

11.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Partially Denied The Rule 35 Motion
A.

Introduction
The District Court abused its discretion when it partially denied Mr. Gill's Rule 35

motion for a reduction of his sentence because the sentence is excessive as altered, in
light of the new information. Although the district court reduced the fixed portion of the
sentence after the Rule 35 hearing, a unified sentence of twenty years is still excessive
given the facts of the case.

14

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Gill's Rule 35
Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence In Light Of Mr. Grant's Continuing Family
Support
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the

sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent,
125 Idaho 251,253 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21 (Ct. App.1987)
and State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447 (Ct. App. 1984)). 'The criteria for examining rulings
denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether
the original sentence was reasonable." Id. (citing Lopez, 106 Idaho at 450, 680 P.2d at
872). If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later
show that it is excessive in view of new or additional information presented with the
motion for reduction. Id. (citing State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114 (Ct. App. 1991)).
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires
the trial court to consider a defendant's mental illness as a sentencing factor. Hollon v.
State, 132 Idaho 573,581 (1999) (citing State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384,391 (1994)). If
a defendant's mental condition is a significant factor, the court is required to consider
factors such as: (a) the extent to which the defendant is mentally ill; (b) the degree of
illness or defect and level of functional impairment; (c) the prognosis for improvement or
rehabilitation; (d) any risk of danger which the defendant may create for the public if not
incarcerated, or the lack of such risk; and (f) the capacity of the defendant to appreciate
the wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the
requirements of the law at the time of the offense charged. Strand, 137 Idaho at 461.
Mr. Gill's mental health evaluator noted that this crime arose when Mr. Gill
underwent a psychotic episode where he actually believed he was someone else. (PSI,
15

p.323.) The evaluator described Mr. Gill's condition as a chronic and persistent thought
disorder. (PSI, p.323.) In the evaluator's opinion, Mr. Gill was not malingering, nor was
this psychotic episode a calculated attempted to avoid the legal consequences of
having to register as a sex offender.

(PSI, p.323.)

Mr. Gill was described as a

"mentally ill individual suffering from a psychotic disconnect from reality, which was
clearly driven by a high level of paranoia and underscored by a strong and persistent
Narcissism." (PSI, p.323.)

Based on the evaluator's assessment, there is no doubt

Mr. Gill is very mentally ill and had little "capacity of the defendant to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements
of the law at the time of the offense charged." See Strand, 137 Idaho at 461. Mr. Gill
acknowledges his psychotic condition and need for treatment. (PSI, p.36.) Mr. Gill listed
as his number one goal in life is to "have a good handle on my mental health [and]
spiritual problems." (PSI, p.66.)

Given Mr. Gill's psychotic episode, the sentence is

excessive given the nature of the offense. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726 (2007)
(recognizing that appellate courts independent review the record, having due regard for
the nature of the offense).
Another mitigating factor that was not given appropriate weight by the district
court when imposing sentence was Mr. Gill's childhood, where he suffered physical and
emotional abuse. See State v. Walker, 129 Idaho 409,410 (Ct. App. 1996) (district court
did not abuse its discretion in imposing fixed sentence of twenty-nine years for first
degree murder because it considered, inter alia, that defendant "had been sexually
assaulted as a child"); see also State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 423 (1985) (one factor
supporting Idaho Supreme Court's holding that the death penalty was excessive was
the defendant's "extremely troubled" childhood with "serious problems in the home
16

environment").

Mr. Gill was physically and mentally abused by his mother, including

being whipped with a strap. (PSI, pp.37, 54-55.) Additionally, his mother threatened to
kill him with a knife. (PSI, p.55.) The abuse was confirmed by his younger brother. (PSI,
p.2; see also Tr. 4/18/2011, p.47, L.2-5.)
Mr. Gill also offered new evidence in support of his Rule 35 motion.

In an

affidavit, Mr. Gill told the court that he would have better access to mental health
treatment outside of prison.

(Affidavit of Mr. Gill, pp.1-2.) Additionally, Mr. Gill was

taking many classes to better himself. (Affidavit of Mr. Gill, p.2.) Mr. Gill's mental health
issues had stabilized and his prescription medications were working well. (Affidavit of
Mr. Gill, p.2.)
employment.

He laid out a detailed plan for release, including housing and
(Affidavit of Mr. Gill, pp.2-5.)

Mr. Gill also submitted additional

documentation showing his willingness to engage in mental health treatment. (Affidavit
of Mr. Gill, pp.25-28.)

Additionally, Mr. Gill was accepted to the Living with Mental

Illness group in prison. (Affidavit of Mr. Gill, p.29.)
For all the reasons stated above, the district court abused its discretion because
Mr. Gill's unified sentence of twenty years, with five years fixed is excessive. Mr. Gill
asks this Court to reduce the indeterminate portion of his sentence from fifteen years to
seven years.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Gill respectfully requests access to the requested transcript and the
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise
as a result of that review.

Alternatively, Mr. Gill asks this Court to reduce the

indeterminate portion of his sentence from fifteen years to seven years.
DATED this 15th day of December, 2011.

JORDANE. TAYLOR
Deputy S.tate Appellate Public Defender
_/
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